By March of 1905 the Mullah was in treaty agreement with
the Italian authorities and had accepted the requirement to live a peaceful
life with his followers in the vicinity of Illig. The British had covertly supported Italian
ambitions elsewhere in Somaliland by
influencing the Zanzibari Sultan to concede the Benadir ports, and by
recognising an Italian land claim near Kismayu.
The Somaliland Protectorate was now under new direction from London as in 1905 the
Colonial Office took over responsibility from the Foreign Office. The Mullah did keep to his side of the
bargain for a couple of years until the grazing areas around Illig became
exhausted and insufficient for his followers’ herds and flocks.
Meanwhile the British reorganised their defence force in
the Somaliland Protectorate. After some
deliberation and changes 6th King’s African Rifles (6 KAR), the
Somali-based battalion, was organised in 1906 as a unit of six rifle
companies. A local Somali Standing
Militia, formed after the Fourth Campaign, had been disbanded after the bulk of
its personnel were transferred into 6 KAR.
Four of the new rifle companies contained Somalis whilst the other two
were composed of seconded Indian Army volunteers. Of the four Somali companies ‘A’ and ‘B’ were
pony-mounted, ‘C’ was mule-mounted and ‘D’ was a Camel Company.
Above: Drummers and buglers of 6 KAR, with a detachment of recruits in the rear, circa 1906, when the 6 KAR was a mixed Indian/Somali unit. The men are all Somalis, including the officer.
One of the Indian companies was stationed in cantonments
near the small Sheikh blockhouse, and the other in a mud fort at Burao. The fort at Bohotle had been dismantled and
those at Shimber Berris and Kirrit were unoccupied; the strong blockhouse at
Las Dureh was garrisoned by a few tribal riflemen. The Somali rifle companies occupied garrison
posts along the caravan routes. Thus the
Protectorate troops were dissipated on outpost duty in locations that probably
would not withstand a serious Dervish attack, and there was no military reserve
to put into the field if such an attack was launched.
In October 1907 the British Under-Secretary of State for
the Colonies, 33 year-old Winston S. Churchill, made a brief stop in Berbera
and travelled inland to see the country.
He was not enthusiastic about what he saw, and recommended either a
withdrawal to the coast or an occupation of the interior that, in an alliance
with the Italians, would crush the Mullah.
He deplored the lack of a submarine communications cable between Berbera
and Aden, which
would be a small investment that could be used to quickly request
reinforcements. Back in London nobody was particularly interested in
Churchill’s report, and it gathered dust whilst its author moved on to become
President of the Board of Trade.
But the Mullah was not without his critics within
Islam. In 1908 he was denounced from Mecca by the head of the
Salihiya Tariqa, Sheikh Salih, as a sinner against Allah and the Prophet, a
veritable kaffir, an unbeliever and a madman.
Although this denunciation was widely circulated in the Protectorate the
British failed to use it to advantage by obtaining the Turkish Grand Mufti’s
comments on the matter, and the Mullah finally shrugged it off, brutally
dealing with opponents who publicly mentioned it.
The 1908-1910 ‘Campaign’
By early 1908 complaints were pouring into Berbera from
the interior stating that agitators were again proclaiming the right of the
Mullah to be the leader of all the Somali inland tribes. The last thing that the British wanted was
the expense of another campaign but something had to be done, and a decision
was made to send around 1,200 KAR Askari from other Protectorates into the
Somaliland interior to uphold British prestige and rule, whilst 300 Indian
Sepoys arrived from Aden.
First to arrive in January 1909 was Battalion Headquarters
and 300 Askari of 1 KAR from Nyasaland, under
Lieutenant Colonel H.A. Walker (Royal Fusiliers). The battalion marched up to Wadamago where it
performed mundane escort duties and fatigues for a year before returning to Nyasaland.
In February 1909 Battalion Headquarters and 450 Askari of
3 KAR, under Lieutenant Colonel J.D. McKay (Middlesex Regiment), arrived from Kenya and also
performed security duties in the Wadamago region for a year. Finally Lieutenant Colonel B.R. Graham (Corps
of Guides, Indian Army), brought his 4 KAR Battalion Headquarters and 460
Askari for their 12-month stint in the Somaliland interior, returning to Uganda in
February 1910.
Despite not firing a shot in anger, all those troops who
had served in Somaliland or off its coastline between August 1908 and January
1910 became eligible for the clasp SOMALILAND
1908-10 to the African General Service Medal.
Whilst the KAR Askari were marching thirstily up and down
the dusty camel trails in the interior without gaining sight of an aggressive
Dervish, Lieutenant General Sir Reginald Wingate, Governor General and Sirdar
of the Sudan, had been attempting without success to negotiate with the
Mullah. Wingate’s partner in this
mission was General Sir Rudolf (Baron) von Slatin, Inspector General of the Sudan. The British administration had become adamant
that it would not finance another campaign, and when Wingate’s & Slatin’s
negotiations failed the decision was made to abandon the interior of the
Protectorate. Italy
protested, as this withdrawal meant an end to the treaty with the Mullah, but Britain was
determined to withdraw into what was termed the Coastal Concentration.
Above: Somali dance
Coastal Concentration
In March 1910 all Somali troops were back at Berbera where
6 KAR was disbanded, a coastal garrison being provided by the Indian Army
contingent that was ordered not to move more than three miles inland. A few local mounted police were
retained. Tribes in the interior who had
sided with the British were extremely disgruntled and fearful for their own
security, as the Dervishes were now openly coming out on the rampage. These tribes were given rifles and ammunition
which they promptly used to settle old scores between themselves, and to
raid. The Mullah raided everyone
everywhere he could and brutal anarchy prevailed; thousands of men, women and
children were killed and tens of thousands of head of stock changed hands. Most tribes sided with the Mullah in order to
survive. Imported merchandise rotted in
Berbera because camel-owners would not risk taking convoys inland.
The formation of the Somaliland Camel Constabulary
This disintegration of British rule in the Somaliland
Protectorate was highlighted in February 1912 when Dervishes penetrated
Berbera, causing panic and leaving a mysterious cabbalistic sign on trees and
buildings. The outskirts of Bulhar were
also raided. The Protectorate Commissioner,
Horace Byatt, vigorously criticised the Coastal Concentration strategy and
demanded a camel-mounted constabulary that could operate within an 80-kilometre
radius of Berbera; the Bikaner Camel Corps that had seen much service in Somaliland was Byatt’s model. Right: Young Richard Corfield
Byatt’s arguments won the day and in September 1912
sanction was given for a Camel Constabulary of 150 Somalis to be raised. The Constabulary was tasked to restore peace
and order amongst the friendly tribes but it was not to be used on offensive
operations against the Dervishes.
Meanwhile earlier in June that year two companies of the Indian Army 119th
Infantry (The Mooltan Regiment) had arrived in Berbera from Aden to protect the
coastal towns, they joined the 200 Sepoys who had remained in the Protectorate
when 6 KAR had been disbanded.
The Mullah observed this British military activity and
thought it a preliminary to another campaign against himself and his
followers. He started one of his
periodic bouts of flowery letter-writing with Byatt, expressing a desire for
peace. Byatt’s answer was to the point –
the Mullah could prove his intentions by ending raids and ceasing exhortations
to tribes ostensibly still under British protection to join the Dervishes in a
jihad or holy war. The Mullah’s
correspondence ceased in 1912 as he entered into a period of building permanent
stone forts at Laba Bari, Bohotle, Damer and Taleh - a magnificent fort that
was his pride and joy. Professional
stone masons and fort-builders were recruited from Yemen to supervise the
construction. It is probable that at
this stage in his life the Mullah was becoming more obese and immobile as a
result of elephantiasis; his days as a swift-moving nomadic warrior were now
just memories.
Above: Corfield and the Constabulary
The battle of Dul Madoba
Command of the Somaliland Camel Constabulary was given to
a 30-year old Political Officer, Richard Conyngham Corfield, who had previous
service in Somaliland, South Africa and Nigeria. The two other officers appointed were Alan
Gibb and Cecil de Sivrac Dunn. Riding
camels and saddlery were obtained from India and musketry training was
conducted near Berbera. By early
December 1912 the Corps was based at Mandera, 68 kilometres south-west of
Berbera and it went into the field to retrieve stolen stock from Sulagudub
raiders. The operation was successful
and 1,282 camels, 11,300 sheep, 170 cows, 17 donkeys, 6 horses and 16 rifles
were delivered to Adadleh where a post of the Indian 119th Infantry
was located. Thirtyeight of the raiders
had been killed for no loss to Corfield’s command. This type of low-level operation continued,
to the satisfaction of the friendly tribes.
Left: Corfield distributing arms in Burao Fort.
In January 1913 the Corps occupied Sheikh and then Burao,
but was not permitted to advance further south although it did move west to
settle disputes at Hargeisa. But
Corfield chafed at the bit and did move south to Idaweina to search for Dervish
raiders. This action resulted in a
critical memorandum to Corfield written by the Acting Commissioner Geoffrey
Francis Archer, who reminded Corfield that the Corps was to stay near Burao and
was not to take offensive action.
Eight months later Archer visited Burao accompanied by
Captain G.H. Summers, 26th (King George’s Own) Light Cavalry, Indian
Army, who commanded the Indian Contingent in Somaliland. Archer’s arrival was quickly followed by
reports of Dervishes attacking friendly tribes between Idoweina, Burao and
Ber. The friendly tribes requested
British protection, and in order to discover the facts Archer authorised
Corfield to make a strong reconnaissance towards Ber; Summers was ordered to
accompany Corfield as the military advisor.
On 8th August a 15-man pony section from the
Constabulary was order to reconnoitre, and shortly afterwards Archer permitted
Corfield with 119 camel-mounted men to follow up the reconnaissance and observe
the situation. The riflemen carried .303
Martini Henry rifles with 140 rounds in bandoliers plus a reserve of 60 rounds
in their saddle bags. Also one Maxim gun
with 4,000 rounds of ammunition packed in cork-lined tin boxes was transported
on camels.
At 1900 hours that evening one of the pony reconnaissance
party was met coming back to report. He
stated that a large force of Dervishes was driving many herds of looted stock
towards Idoweina; the reconnaissance party had engaged the enemy, firing over
80 rounds each, and had hit several Dervishes who in retaliation had killed two
ponies. Corfield advanced for a couple
of hours and then formed a zariba with the camels sat down in the centre. The fires in the Dervish camp could be seen
about eight kilometres distant. The pony
section returned with a Dervish strength estimate of 2,000 footmen and 150
mounted men, all armed with rifles. The
Dervish leader was Ow Yusuf Abdillah Hassan, a brother of the Mullah. Local friendly Dolbahanta tribesmen assured
Corfield that they would provide at least 300 men tomorrow, armed with rifles
or spears, to assist in recovering their stolen stock.
Corfield expressed his intention of either attacking the
Dervish camp that night or of intercepting the enemy during the next day, and
he sought Summers’ opinion. Summers was
adamant that Corfield could not win a battle against such a strong Dervish
force, and he urged him to stick to his orders and just reconnoitre. But Corfield wanted a battle and he decided
to intercept the Dervishes the next day.
Corfield moved his men out at dawn, tracking the Dervish
line of march by the dust clouds that the herds threw up. At 0645 hours near a location named Dul
Mahoba (black hill) Corfield’s men were ordered into a skirmish line to face
the left flank of the Dervish advance, with the Dolbahanta tribesmen positioned
on the left flank. Corfield attempted to
advance his line through thick bush in order to reach more open ground ahead
but the Dervish advance was too swift, catching Corfield in a totally unsound
position where his men could not always see each other. Summers urged Corfield to form a square, the
safest formation to adopt as it could not be dangerously out-flanked as a line
could, but Corfield wanted all his riflemen to fire at the same time, and so he
left them floundering in a skirmish line without a reserve of troops or flank
or rear protection.
The Dervishes scented victory and charged forward, firing
as they ran; nearly all the Dolbahanta tribesmen immediately fled the
scene. The Constabulary line was quickly
outflanked causing some of Corfield’s men to disperse to the rear. The Maxim gun fired three belts but was then
permanently put out of action by bullet strikes on the mechanism. Richard Corfield, who had positioned himself
near the gun, was shot and died instantly at about 0715 hours.
Summers, who was hit three times and badly wounded, and
Dunn rallied their surviving men and formed a protective zareba from the bodies
of the dead camels and ponies that now littered the battlefield. The wounded were brought into the zareba and
a very few Somali officers and senior ranks began to exert fire discipline over
the surviving riflemen. Dervish attacks,
which consisted of forward rushes that sometimes delivered warriors into the
zareba, continued until 1100 hours when they began to tail away, and an hour
later the Dervishes withdrew altogether with their captured herds as their
stocks of ammunition were exhausted. The
Dolbahanta who had initially fled the scene now returned to loot the bodies on
the battlefield.
Dunn, now the force commander, sent a report to Archer and
cleared the battlefield whilst a reconnaissance patrol followed the Dervish
movements. Twenty six riflemen remained
fit to fight, and 16 wounded needed evacuation on the surviving camels. In his after-action report Summers praised
Colour Sergeants Gaboba Ali and Jama Hersi and Sergeant Jama Said for the
leadership and gallantry that they displayed during the battle. He also commented on the extreme bravery of
the Dervishes, and on their use of modern rifles that had been obtained from
traders working out of Djibouti
and Muscat.
Above: Taleh Fort
At around 1500 hours that afternoon, when the
reconnaissance patrol had established that the Dervishes were not lying in
wait, Dunn withdrew to Idoweina where foul but just-drinkable water was found,
and then moved slowly through the night to meet up with Archer at Gombur Magag,
30 kilometres from Burao which was itself reached on the morning of 10th
August.
As well as the death of Corfield and the wounding of
Summers, 32 riflemen were killed and 15 wounded in the zareba. A further 31 riflemen had gone missing from
the zareba but most re-joined the column the next day. The losses in mounts were 50 camels and 9
ponies; the Dervishes had seized four of these camels, the remainder being
either killed in the battle or wounded and put down later. The number of Dervish dead was estimated at
between 200 and 600; many Dervish wounded later died of their wounds. As the Mullah had ordered the ponies to be
tied up away from the battlefield all the Dervish mounts survived. Awards made for the action were Captain
Gerald H. Summers appointed to be a Brevet Major and Captain Cecil de S. Dunn
to receive the Police Medal. During 1913
Geoffrey Archer was appointed a Companion of the Most Distinguished Order of
Saint Michael and Saint George (CMG).
Withdrawal from Burao
The Camel Constabulary needed re-organising and Archer
withdrew it to the coast; the friendly tribes around Burao swiftly followed and
were housed in a temporary camp near Berbera.
Britain
again lost prestige in the interior and a further bout of anarchic raiding and
looting ensued. In September 1913 Alan
Gibb returned to the Protectorate from overseas leave and took over command of
the Camel Constabulary from Dunn. Three
months later Major A.S. Lawrance, 1st County of London Yeomanry
and a former officer in 6 KAR, took over from Gibb. The Somaliland Camel Corps, as it was soon to
be titled, was authorised to recruit a total of 300 men. Meanwhile in the interior the Mullah, who had
written a dramatic popular poem about Corfield’s defeat, was advancing his
influence by building strong masonry forts at Jidali, Urgai and even Shimber
Berris – only 80 kilometres from Burao.
Above: Q SUD M,AGSM JUBA, SOMAL 02-04, NAN 05-06, SOMAL 08-10, K SUD M Hafir & Firket
·
Moyse-Bartlett, H., The King’s African Rifles. 1956, Gale & Polden Ltd, Aldershot.
Reprinted by The Naval & Military Press Ltd. ·
Jardine, Douglas, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland. 1923, Herbert Jenkins Ltd., London. Downloadable here: https://archive.org/details/TheMadMullahOfSomaliland ·
Beachey, Ray. Warrior
Mullah. The Horn Aflame 1892-1920.
1990, Bellew Publishing, London. ·
Digest of History of Somaliland Camel
Corps, KAR. (The National Archives reference: WO 106/272). ·
3rd Battalion King’s African Rifles Historical Record 1895-1928. (The National Archives
reference: WO 106/270). ·
Hayward, J.,
Birch, D., and Bishop, R., British
Battles and Medals. 2006, Spink, London. ·
Despatches published in The
London Gazette. ·
Magor, R.B., African General Service Medals. 1983, Naval & Military Press.
The 1908-1910 ‘Campaign’
Left: Corfield distributing arms in Burao Fort.
Corfield expressed his intention of either attacking the
Dervish camp that night or of intercepting the enemy during the next day, and
he sought Summers’ opinion. Summers was
adamant that Corfield could not win a battle against such a strong Dervish
force, and he urged him to stick to his orders and just reconnoitre. But Corfield wanted a battle and he decided
to intercept the Dervishes the next day.
