After the British Foreign
Office took over responsibility for Somaliland
from the Indian government in 1898 administrative policy hardly changed. The British contented themselves with
activities along the coastal region and the interior was left alone, protection
being offered verbally to tribes who requested it. The Somali Coast Police, the only local
military force in the territory, held one or two posts on the approach routes
to the coast but otherwise its members were stationed in the coastal
towns. A company of Indian soldiers was
sent from the Aden
garrison, and these sepoys also were stationed on the coast.
This state of affairs was
changed radically by the appearance of a Somali named Sayyid Muhammad ‘Abdullah
Hassan, later known by the British as the Mad Mullah, a tall, thin,
dark-skinned man with a small goatee beard.
Hassan is believed to have been born around 1856 near Kirrit in
Dulbahante country where his mother lived; his father is thought to have come
from the Ogaden region. In 1894 Hassan
travelled to Mecca
to perform Haj and there came under the influence of a mystic, Muhammed Salih,
a member of a reformist sect. The
following year Hassan returned to Berbera and began preaching, but his
puritanical sermons made little impression on the commercially-minded coastal
Somalis. In 1897 he is believed to have
moved to his mother’s tribal region in the interior where he began recruiting a
group of followers who took vows renouncing the pursuit of wealth, and who
welcomed an austere, disciplined lifestyle.
Initially Hassan came to prominence as an arbitrator in tribal disputes,
but his over-riding motivation was a patriotic devotion towards the removal of
Christian invaders from Somali territory.
Right: An artists impression of Sayyid
Muhammad ‘Abdullah Hassan
Cruel and ruthless if necessary
Hassan developed into a
strong leader and disciplinarian who attained his objectives by cruel and ruthless
force if persuasion failed. He began
raiding the stocks of tribes under British protection and confronting the
Ethiopians who were entering the Ogaden region from Harar. He established his base at Burao where he
maintained around 1,500 men of whom only 200 had rifles. However French traders in Djibouti saw an opportunity and
began running loads of rifles and ammunition by camel train to Burao where
Hassan purchased them. Besides the
potential threat to Berbera the British became concerned as they had no troops
in the interior to back up their guarantees of protection to friendly
tribes. The 2nd Central
Africa Regiment composed of infantry soldiers recruited in Nyasaland was
despatched from Mauritius to
Berbera in February 1900, allowing the Indian company to return to Aden. The African Askari were initially located in
three posts at Berbera, Sheikh and the Adadleh Wells that were near Syk and the
Jerato Pass.
Another post was later located at Burao when Hassan’s men moved
away. The Askari disrupted the French
traders’ supply of arms by the overland route, so the French then sailed
boat-loads of arms and ammunition along the coast eastwards from Djibouti
towards harbours in Italian territory where Hassan’s agents were waiting to
receive them. The 2nd Central
Africa Regiment believed that it had one splendid opportunity to kill or
capture Hassan and destroy his force when news came that Hassan was camped at
Milmil with his herds out grazing. The
Askari under Major A.W.V. Plunkett marched to Milmil and found that their foe
was camped just across the Abyssinian border, but the British Consul-General at
Berbera, Colonel J. Hayes-Sadler, had given Plunkett strict instructions to
stay within British territory. Plunkett
complied and the opportunity was lost.
By now Hassan’s closest
followers were becoming known as Dervishes, and he titled himself Mullah. The British began referring to him as The Mad
Mullah and there are two theories as to why this happened. Firstly he is believed to have had surgery on
his head performed by a tribal doctor when he was young, and this unsettled his
temperament. Secondly when he first
started preaching at Berbera his radical sermons attracted comments that he was
irrational in his thinking. The use of
the word ‘Mad’ can be seen now to have been an unfortunate choice. Whatever personality traits that the Mullah
displayed, they did not affect his military performance as one of the most
formidable insurgent leaders that the British Empire
ever had to face. It was only 20 years
later when the Mullah had forsaken his nomadic lifestyle for a more settled
existence that he became vulnerable to British military technology developed
during the First World War.
Left: Bringing in thorns for making a zareba
The background to the First Campaign
The first large-scale military
action by followers of the Mullah, although he was not present, was in March
1900 when a Somali force of around 6,000 spearmen attacked an Abyssinian force
at Jijiga east of Harar. The 1,500
well-armed Abyssinians stood their ground and shot down over 2,500 Somali
attackers. The fact that the Mullah had
been able to raise and motivate 6,000 men alarmed both the British and the
Abyssinians, and three months later the latter suggested to the British that a
combined operation be mounted against the Dervishes.
Meanwhile the 2nd
Central Africa Regiment (soon to be re-titled The King’s African Rifles) was
urgently needed for operations in West Africa, and by December 1900 all the
Askari had left Somaliland. Hayes-Sadler supported the Abyssinian
proposal and suggested raising a local Somali force which would take the field
in conjunction with the Abyssinians. The
British government quickly agreed to this plan because military commitments
elsewhere in South Africa, China, West Africa
and Jubaland had led to a shortage of regular troops. Captain and Local Lieutenant Colonel Eric
J.E. Swayne, Indian Army, well-known in Somaliland
because of his explorations, was selected to raise the local force. Hayes-Sadler’s orders to Swayne were to
capture or defeat the Mullah and to put an end to his influence in the
Dulbahante country. Swayne was
sanctioned to raise 1,000 marching infantrymen, 400 mounted infantrymen on
ponies, and 100 infantrymen mounted on camels.
All the levies, as these 1500 recruits were called, were to be armed
with rifles. Officers were sent from the
British and Indian armies and 50 Punjabi Muslim military instructors were
promised from India.
The raising, training and organising of the Somali levies
Orders to raise levies were
issued on 22 November 1900 and six days later Eric Swayne was marching the
first 250 men to Adadleh to take over the askari positions. Twelve hundred Somalis had stepped forward to
enlist as soon as recruitment commenced, their motivation being exasperation at
the looting and killing being carried out by the Mullah’s followers. Men were only enlisted if they came from
trustworthy tribes and if a Chief vouched for them; Dulbahante tribesmen were
not recruited. The daily rate of pay was 12 rupees, four rupees less than the
Somali Coast Police received. Training
was concentrated because of shortage of time but included obedience to orders,
basic drill movements, infantry formations, shooting and the recognition of
bugle calls. The Askari had handed over
150 Martini-Enfield single-loading .303 rifles, and along with spare rifles
held by the Coastal Police these armed the first 250 men. Two officers from the 2nd Central
African Rifles, Lieutenants H.F. Byrne and E.U. Walsh, remained in Somaliland to assist Swayne and they were stationed at
Hargeisa and Adadleh. The Coastal Police
initially provided 40 non-commissioned officers for the levies but Swayne soon
found that there were suitable men for promotion within the ranks. These junior leaders were trained by four
Indian instructors borrowed from the Aden
garrison until the 50 being sent from India arrived. After additional training several Somalis
were appointed as local officers.
Shipments of rifles and
Maxim machine guns arrived in February 1901, allowing weapon training
programmes and range practice to be carried out by all the levies. The rifle shooting skills of the Somalis,
particularly at accurate volley-firing, quickly became impressive. Somali gun teams were formed and trained for
the three Maxims, and the teams were soon proficient despite a lack of
mekometers for range finding. Camels
carried the Maxims and ammunition.
Riding camels were imported from Aden
and transport and eating camels and other food supplies purchased locally. Equipment, stores, barbed wire and water
tanks for mounting onto camels were ordered from Egypt,
India or England. The Aden
garrison provided explosives for enlarging rocky wells, blue lights for night
work and signal rockets. Camel caravans
were regularly sent up to Adadleh where stockpiles of supplies were formed.
Swayne had a setback
Swayne had a setback when he
tried to raise 400 mounted men with their own ponies and saddles. The friendly tribes did not want to weaken
their own security over their herds which had now been pushed north by the
Mullah’s men towards the coast, where good grazing was scarce. Initially only 100 mounted levies came
forward to enlist. Swayne then purchased ponies and saddles and mounted some of
his infantrymen on them, enlisting additional infantrymen to make up his
required manpower totals. Spearmen, some
on their own horses, were hired on an “as required” basis to guard the animal
transport and captured livestock; they received no pay but were guaranteed to
receive camels captured from the Dervish herds.
Before marching inland from Berbera each of the levies was given an
allowance for the purchase of local shoes and a piece of American cloth. The levies also received a small allowance to
give to their families before the men departed.
Spare hides and lengths of steel were taken inland by enlisted cobblers
and metalworkers so that shoes could be repaired and axes made for the
construction of thorn-tree zaribas, or defensive fences.
Left: Somali Spearmen
Twenty one British officers
joined Swayne and he organised his infantry into two corps each of 500 men,
using Captains M. McNeill and G.E. Phillips as the corps commanders. Major W.G.L. Beynon DSO, Swayne’s Second In
Command, commanded all the mounted troops having under him Captain J.W.B.
Mereweather with the mounted infantry and Captain C.M.D. Bruce with the camel
corps. Captain D.A. Friedrichs was appointed as Swayne’s Adjutant, or principal
staff officer. Lieutenant H. Boulton
with a small detachment from the Indian Medical Service provided medical
support and he was the only qualified doctor on the campaign. A British armourer sergeant accompanied the
force to maintain the weapons. Two
liaison officers were sent to work with the Abyssinian forces, Brevet Major the
Honourable A.H.C. Hanbury-Tracy and Captain R.P. Cobbold. Unfortunately, one of the British officers,
Lieutenant L.W. de Sausmarez, was killed in an accidental shooting incident at
Burao.
Operations delayed by late rains
The 50 Punjabi instructors
had only arrived from India
as Swayne set out on his operations, and so he decided to keep them together
rather than split them around the force.
Swayne’s strategy relied on marching faster than his enemy and so
surprising him. The Punjabis marched at
a slower pace than the Somalis and they also required more administrative
support, particularly with special rations.
Swayne was also determined to seize the camel herds belonging to the
Mullah’s followers. He later wrote in
his after-action report:
“In
Somaliland life revolves around the
camel. The people live on the milk for
the greater part of the year, and without the camel the best grazing grounds
distant from water would be unattainable, for sheep have to be kept near the
wells. Without the camel the bulk of the
people could not exist. In
forming plans of attack, therefore, it was important to bear in mind that if
the flocks and herds of the enemy could be captured the men would inevitably be
compelled either to make terms or to collect to attack the expedition.”
Swayne’s operational
movements were delayed for two months because of late rains which denied him
grazing in the interior for his ponies, riding camels and transport camels, and
it was not until late May that his levies concentrated at Burao and started
searching for the Mullah’s forces. This
delay upset the Abyssinian plans as they had started moving east from Jijiga in
January and by May they were running out of food. The Abyssinian soldiers could not exist on
meat alone as could the Somalis, and the Mullah’s men had removed the grain in
the areas that the Abyssinians occupied.
Although the British and Abyssinian forces never managed to act in
concert, the Abyssinian advance had made the Mullah move eastwards into
Dulbahante country.
The British formed two
columns, Swayne commanding the more mobile one whilst McNeill commanded the
slower one which included most of the transport camels. Scouts had reported that the Mullah with
5,000 men was south of Yahayl and both British columns marched southeast from
Burao through Ber and Eyl-Dab. On the
way the Mullah’s stockaded village and former headquarters at Kob-Fardod were
burnt down, with the exception of the mosques which were untouched. The mounted troops were tasked with raiding
the herds of the Mahmud Gerad Dulbahante tribe which supported the Mullah. These herds were grazing 50 miles to the east
of the line of march and Beynon successfully seized 300 camels. On 30 May both columns and the mounted troops
with the captured camels met up at Samali (see map) where there was a large
pool of rainwater.
The attack at Samali
Swayne ordered McNeill to
defend Samali and two adjacent thorn zaribas strengthened by barbed wire
were built. The upper zariba
included the crest of a small hill overlooking the surrounding countryside and
housed the men, with a .450-inch Maxim gun positioned on a cairn of
stones. The lower zariba housed
all the transport animals and captured stock and ran down the hill towards the
water. McNeill’s force consisted of 370
riflemen, 70 spearmen and a few mounted Somalis who went out scouting. Also twenty of the Punjabis were with
McNeill, the remainder having been detailed to join the Burao garrison.
Swayne moved off to search for the
Mullah’s herds on 2 June, with his mobile column taking only hospital and Maxim
gun transport camels plus some eating camels as rations. Enemy scouts reported the British movements
so the Mullah marched his men, to avoid contact with Swayne, and advanced on
Samali. The Mahmud Gerad Dulbahantes
were pressing the Mullah to recover their seized camels and the Mullah was
anxious to do this and also to seize all McNeill’s animals, which totalled over
3,000 camels and 50 horses, plus the rifles of the levies that were going to be
killed at Samali. The Mullah would then
have been well enough armed to engage Swayne’s column.
At around 1600 hours that
day McNeill’s outlying pickets came in reporting that enemy horsemen were
trying to seize camels that had been led out of the zariba to
graze. Effective use of the Maxim gun at
1,200 yards range emptied some saddles and thwarted the enemy. All the British stock was driven back into
the lower zariba except for two camels and 20 sheep that were lost. Two of McNeill’s men were over-run by the
enemy and their bodies were later found stabbed into pieces by spear thrusts.
Then about 2,000 of the Mullah’s spearmen and 500 of his horsemen appeared out
of the bush and advanced on the zaribas.
Fifty to 60 of these men had rifles which they fired as they
advanced. As the lower zariba was
near the bush and vulnerable at one corner Lieutenant J.C. Lampfrey had been
posted there with some levy riflemen and spearmen. Meanwhile the riflemen and Maxim gunner in
the upper zariba shot over the top of the lower zariba into the
enemy’s advancing ranks, which broke up the advance. Just after last light a determined assault
was made on the lower zariba and Lampfrey’s men were closely
engaged. Although some of the enemy were
killed whilst touching the fence, none managed to get through the thorn barrier
to reach the animals.
Simultaneously a determined
assault was made on the upper zariba in an attempt to capture the
Maxim. Effective fire by the gun and by
the 20 Punjabis who were positioned around it stopped any enemy from
penetrating the protective barbed wire barrier.
When the moon came up at 2100 hours the enemy spear and riflemen
withdrew taking many dead and wounded with them. Throughout the night sounds could be heard
indicating that the Mullah’s men were re-positioning themselves in the bush.
5,000 men in a long line,
several ranks deep
After first light McNeill
sent patrols out around the zaribas and they found 12 enemy dead near
the Maxim cairn and five others just outside the stock zariba. More dead men and horses were lying further
out, but the patrols did not linger as further enemy action was expected. At 0845 hours around 5,000 of the Mullah’s
men emerged from the bush, all on foot, in a long line several ranks deep. The line extended from beyond the Maxim cairn
to beyond the pool of water, allowing each end of the line to envelop the
British zaribas and engage them on three sides. Up to 100 of the Mullah’s men were carrying
rifles.
McNeill had ordered no shots
to be fired over 500 yards range, and although the levies were excited they
maintained their discipline and only fired when they were ordered to. Then a very heavy British fire was laid down
which repeatedly broke up enemy advances.
None of the Mullah’s men got within 150 yards of the upper zariba. Lampfrey and his men were in close action
again in the lower zariba, the Mullah’s men getting close enough to hurl
spears, wooden clubs and stones at the defenders. Two of Lampfrey’s men were killed and one
wounded by spears. As the upper zariba
was relatively secure the lower zariba was reinforced and this extra
firepower drove the enemy away. Although
during the previous evening the Mullah had exhorted his followers to fight and
win, the enemy cohesion was now broken and the Mullah’s forces retreated to the
hills and began making for their own territory.
McNeill had insufficient
mounted troops to pursue the enemy but his patrols did bring in prisoners found
in the nearby bush. These prisoners were
used to recover 180 dead enemy bodies, 15 of them being in the water pool. The bodies were dumped in deep crevices 600
yards down-wind of the pool. The British
had lost ten men killed and eight wounded.
Several rifles were recovered from the bush.
It was learned from the prisoners that
the Mullah watched the second day’s fight from a hill to the south. He was accompanied by his chief advisor, Haji
Sudi, a former interpreter for the Royal Navy at Suakin and previously a head
man on European hunting safaris. They
departed when they saw that the battle was lost.
14,000 camels seized
Meanwhile Swayne’s infantry
were marching eastwards each carrying a rifle, bayonet, equipment, 100 rounds
of ammunition, two days’ rations of dried meat and dates and a sheep-skin
container holding about one gallon of water.
The first news they had of the fighting at Samali was when Swayne’s
scouts came across some of the Mullah’s men fleeing through the bush and took
prisoners. Swayne’s troops now attacked
the routed Dervish forces, killing probably 200 of them and wounding many
more. The Mullah and his survivors
finally gained refuge in Italian territory, many men having died of wounds or
thirst on the way. The British estimated
that in total the enemy had suffered up to 1,000 casualties.
Right: Maxim Gun on a camel
McNeill’s column now marched
to join Swayne at Lasadar and as there were no organised enemy forces in the
area to oppose them the British seized 14,000 camels, 1,000 cattle and 30,000
sheep from tribes who had allied themselves with the Mullah. These seizures involved hard marching of up
to 30 to 40 miles each day through thick bush by columns of levies. This led to the tribal leaders coming in and
surrendering unconditionally. Meanwhile
the Mullah regrouped at Mudug (see map) with his more fanatical followers, and
being threatened from the south by the Sultan of Obbia he decided to return to
Dulbuhante country and re-establish Dervish authority.
The action at Ferdiddin
Swayne’s
whole force was now feeling the strain of marching swiftly over long
distances. Hayes-Sadler ordered an end
to operations but just then Swayne’s scouts gained information that the Mullah’s
force was at Ferdiddin (see map). Swayne
decided, despite Sadler’s orders, to seize the initiative and attack as that
would in fact be a safer option than withdrawing whilst the enemy force was in
the vicinity. On 16 June 100 levies and
the transport animals were left behind at Courgerad, fourteen miles from the
enemy camp. At midnight a night march
was made, only 16 transport camels carrying Maxim guns and water being taken
forward on the march. Ferdiddin was
approached at first light, and prisoners captured on the spot stated that the
Mullah’s village was three miles ahead beyond a spur. The British advanced in three groups. An infantry column on the right under Captain
Phillips moved to take some dominant hills, another infantry column on the left
under Captain MacNeill advanced across a plain, and the mounted troops under
Beynon were sent forward in the centre to reconnoitre. The mounted troops were now reduced to 75 men
due to the detailing of escorts to march prisoners and captured stock back to
Burao. Lieutenant F.A. Dickinson with a reserve infantry force followed Beynon.
Lieutenant Friedrichs
commanded the advance party of the mounted troops and as his group passed
through some thick bush an enemy ambush was sprung. Friedrichs was killed whilst attempting to
rescue a non commissioned officer of the levies. Enemy rifle fire now started knocking down
the transport camels and half of the horses and camels of the mounted
force. Dickinson was ordered to run forward with his
men to occupy the spur which was two miles away. The seizure of the spur was quickly achieved
although Dickinson
suffered a leg-wound in the process. Dickinson’s men and the
unwounded levy machine gunners now disentangled the Maxims and belts of
ammunition from the dead and wounded camels and brought the guns into action on
the spur. This fire support allowed the mounted troops to disengage and fall
back onto the spur.
Spalte 2
Meanwhile MacNeill’s and Phillips’
columns pressed forward on the left and right and once Phillips had seized the
hills the British had the advantage and fired from above onto the Mullah’s
men. A Somali officer now led Dickinson’s men down the
spur in a charge towards the enemy positions and this, combined with the
advances of the flanking columns, broke the enemy resistance. Swayne’s levies pursued the enemy for five
miles, shooting several brave Dervishes who stood and fought rearguard actions
ordered by the Mullah. The withdrawal of
the Mullah’s men quickly turned into flight towards Italian territory. Swayne now halted his men as his supplies of
water were almost exhausted and after burning the Mullah’s village at Ferdiddin
the British withdrew and re-grouped at Courgerad. British casualties at Ferdiddin were one
British officer killed and one wounded and eleven levies killed and 17
wounded. The Mullah’s force was believed
to have lost 200 men killed or wounded, more dying of wounds and thirst as they
fled. The Mullah’s party is thought to
have survived by cutting open the stomachs of dead camels in order to drink the
water found there. Eight hundred
prisoners had been taken by the British including many Chiefs and headmen; most
of them were later released after coming to terms with the British administration.
Orders from London;
friendly tribes left unprotected
The Foreign Office in London now ordered the
campaign to cease and Swayne marched to Burao with his men and transport
animals via suitable water holes.
Burao was reached on 30 July and the force began to disband. Captured stock was returned to friendly
tribes who had lost it to the Mullah in the first place, spearmen were paid off
with camels and some of the levies opted for this form of payment rather than
cash. Wounded men and relatives of the
dead were also compensated with camels.
The sheep and milch goats, apart from a small percentage eaten by the
levies, were returned to the enemy’s women and children.
Despite the friendly and
subdued tribes emphatically telling Swayne that when the Mullah returned they
would have to submit to him or lose their herds, because they had no rifles
with which to defend themselves, London decided not to permanently garrison
Burao or anywhere else inland. The
levies were reduced to a Camel Corps 100 strong and an infantry force 500
strong. The discharged levies were
enrolled in a Militia from which they could be re-engaged as levies if
required. The remaining 600 serving
levies were all stationed on or near the coast.
It was not to be long before the Mullah took advantage of this fact.
An inconclusive end to the Campaign
This First British Campaign
against the Mullah was inconclusive in that the he was not killed or captured
and neither side received a devastating blow in battle. However, the campaign was important in that
Swayne understood the potential of the Somali soldier, and apart from a handful
of British and Indian personnel, all the troops in the British force were
Somali. This situation was never to be
repeated as in the future African, Indian and British soldiers, sailors and
airmen made major contributions to campaigns in Somaliland.
Eric Swayne and his Somalis
worked on a basis of mutual respect and understanding. He included the following comments in his
final report:
It
was not advisable, nor was it necessary, to dragoon the levies, whose mobility
was, to a great extent, the outcome of their being an irregular corps. I had whilst in the Uganda Rifles, some opportunity of
contrasting Somalis with Sudanese, and I found the Somalis in the main perhaps
easier to manage. Provided
the men are treated with the same consideration as is used in the native army
in India,
they will readily respond by doing their best.
It was unfortunate that many of the officers could only communicate with
their men through interpreters who, in some cases, were prone to make the most
of their position.
Swayne commanded the next campaign
against the Mullah, but after that no future British campaign commander in Somaliland would ever equal Swayne in the knowledge that
he had acquired of the territory and its people.
A zebra for King Edward
All officers and men on the
campaign, including those attached to the Abyssinians, were awarded the African
General Service Medal with a clasp inscribed “SOMALILAND
1901”. Unfortunately it appears that
less than 400 of the levies actually received their medals, as by the time the
medal rolls were prepared and the medals manufactured and sent to Somaliland
the whereabouts of many of the former levies was not known.
Sixteen of the British
officers received mentions in Swayne’s despatches as did three of the local
men. The mention of one of the three
read: Ressaldar Musa Farah has served
Government for some 13 years. He is
thoroughly trustworthy, and the most intelligent Somali I have ever met, and
far above the average of Indian native officers. He has more influence in the country than any
tribal Chief, and has frequently been employed on detached work, where his
tact, judgement and firmness have always insured satisfactory results. He is tireless in the saddle, and got the
utmost out of the company of mounted infantry he commanded. He was conspicuously brought to my notice for
gallantry in action at Ferdiddin by the Officer Commanding the Mounted
Corps.
Captain G.E. Phillips and
Captain M. McNeill received Distinguished Service Orders. Major W.G.L. Beynon, who already possessed a
Distinguished Service Order, received the brevet rank of Lieutenant Colonel
when he attained the rank of substantive major.
Major The Honourable A.H.C. Hanbury-Tracy became an Ordinary Member
Third Class of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George
for his liaison duties with the Abyssinians.
He was also invested with the Order of the Most Brilliant Star of
Ethiopia of the second class, and Emperor Menelik placed in his charge a zebra
which was to be a gift to King Edward.
References: Frontier
and Overseas Expeditions from India Volume VI, Expeditions Overseas, reprinted by The Naval & Military Press
Ltd. Hamilton, Angus, Somaliland, 1911, Hutchinson and Co., London. Jardine, Douglas, The Mad Mullah of
Somaliland, 1923, Herbert Jenkins Ltd., London. Magor, R. B., African General Service
Medals, The Naval and Military Press, revision of
1993 edition. McNeill, Malcolm and Dixon,
A.C.H., In
Pursuit of the “Mad” Mullah, reprinted in the Legacy
Reprint Series. Moyse-Bartlett, Lt. Col. H., The King’s African Rifles, reprinted by The Naval & Military Press Ltd. The London Gazette. The Official History Of The
Operations In Somaliland 1901-04, reprinted by The Naval & Military Press Ltd.
(This
article appeared in a recent issue of the Journal of the Anglo-Somali Society.)